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Giving the People a Voice? Experiments
with consultative authoritarian
institutions in China
BAOGANG HE and STIG THØGERSEN*
In the last decade Chinese consultative authoritarianism has been renewed through many
political and administrative innovations and tools. Authoritarian rule in China is now permeated
by a wide variety of consultative and deliberative practices. These practices stabilize and
strengthen authoritarian rule, leading to deliberative authoritarianism, an advanced form of
consultative authoritarianism. This paper discusses two experiments—deliberative polling at
Zeguo, Zhejiang, and a township election in Ya’an, Sichuan. Through these two cases we examine
the direction which the development of consultative authoritarianism is presently taking, and the
potentials and limitations of such input mechanisms in an authoritarian setting.
In the last decade there have been many political and administrative reforms in China
which have given rise to a redefinition and restructuring of Chinese authoritarianism.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has long realized that it urgently needs to boost
its legitimacy by improving the relationship between state and citizens, but at the
same time it is opposed to reforms that can lead to ‘Western’ democracy. In order to
address this dilemma, structural reforms aimed at streamlining and downsizing the
administration and making it more transparent and less corrupt have been
implemented. Parallel to such attempts to rationalize the bureaucratic system,
however, there is also a drive to create what Andrew Nathan has called ‘input
institutions’, which should make it possible for ordinary citizens to express their
opinions and have some influence on local political decisions.1
This paper discusses two experiments aimed at developing such new tools for
giving voice to ordinary citizens without jeopardizing the CCP’s monopoly on
political decision making. The first case concerns a series of deliberative forums that
* Professor Baogang He is chair in International Studies, at Deakin University, Australia; Stig Thøgersen is
professor of China Studies at Aarhus University, Denmark. They were committee members of the Ya’An township
election project (2002–2006) with the support of the Danish International Development Agency. Baogang He has
also played roles of advice, coordination, facilitation and training in conducting the deliberative polling experiment in
Zeguo between 2005 and 2009. Baogang would like to thank ARC grants (DP0666271 and DP0986641) for his
research work on deliberative democracy in China.
1. Andrew Nathan, ‘Authoritarian resilience’, Journal of Democracy 14(1), (2003), pp. 6–17. For a discussion
on political participation, see Baogang He, ‘A survey study of voting behavior and political participation in Zhejiang’,
Japanese Journal of Political Science 7(3), (2006), pp. 225–246.
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have been held in Zeguo township, Zhejiang province, to decide the priority of
infrastructural projects and how the annual town budget should be spent. These
forums have been developing and enhanced over several years and they have received
official praise. The other case is an experiment with the popular election of township
leaders in Ya’an district, Sichuan province, which was well received in the press but
was not allowed to spread to other localities or become a model for future reforms.
Through these two cases we examine the direction which the development of
consultative institutions is presently taking, and the potentials and limitations of such
input mechanisms in an authoritarian setting. The two cases are different in many
respects, but they both contain an element of what we shall call ‘consultative
authoritarianism’ in the sense that they represent different ways of channelling public
opinion and political energy into the political decision-making process without
abandoning the principle of the CCP’s monopoly on political power.
The term consultative authoritarianism has been used by Harry Harding to describe
how the post-Mao political system ‘increasingly recognizes the need to obtain
information, advice, and support from key sectors of the population, but insists on
( . . . ) maintaining ultimate political power in the hands of the Party’.2 Similarly,
Carol Hamrin has used it to describe how the Chinese state in the early 1980s was
beginning to take the interests and views of intellectuals into account.3 The
deliberative forums and consultative elections discussed in this paper fit this general
description but demonstrate how reform-minded local cadres are modifying and
refining consultative authoritarianism. The Zeguo experiment attempted to generate
better public policy and confer legitimacy by making consultative authoritarianism
more deliberative. The Ya’an experiment introduced a larger component of direct
election into what still fundamentally remained a consultative appointment procedure
for local officials. Moreover, both these experiments expanded the target group of the
consultation process. The ‘key sectors of the population’ mentioned by Harding are
no longer just members of elite groups. It has become necessary for the CCP to pay
more attention to the voices of the ‘masses’ (qunzhong)—ordinary citizens who, on a
daily basis, judge local officials by their deeds.
The paper first looks briefly at the political reform context of the experiments. After a
review of the two cases it discusses how they are linked to national level political
reforms and offer some significant examples of other consultative mechanisms that
are presently being implemented around the country. The conclusion makes some
general remarks on the nature and characteristics of consultative authoritarianism.
The national context of political reforms
Although Chinese political reforms are often seen in the West as lagging behind the
country’s sweeping changes in the economic field, the CCP has actually shown
a remarkable degree of political flexibility and adaptability over the last three
2. Harry Harding, China’s Second Revolution. Reform after Mao (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution,
1987), p. 200.
3. Carol Lee Hamrin, ‘Conclusion: new trends under Deng Xiaoping and his successors’, in Merle Goldman with
Timothy Cheek and Carol Lee Hamrin, eds, China’s Intellectuals and the State: In Search of a New Relationship
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 275–304.
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decades. As David Shambaugh has shown, the experience of the Soviet Union taught
the Chinese leaders that an ossified party-state is bound to collapse, and they are still
working hard and systematically to avoid meeting this fate.4
Most reforms have aimed at strengthening bureaucratic efficiency and the Party’s
governing capacity rather than at empowering ordinary citizens, but CCP leaders
repeatedly commit themselves to the idea of democracy. In December 2008 Hu
Jintao again expressed this commitment. At a meeting in December 2008 celebrating
the thirtieth anniversary of the policy of reform and opening he said: ‘Without
democracy, neither socialism nor socialist modernization could be realized’. However,
he stressed that we ‘will never copy the mode of the Western political institutions’.5
What sort of ‘democracy with Chinese characteristics’ are the Chinese leaders
envisioning?6 Judging from the political reforms of the last two decades, they appear
to follow two main paths: more consultations with elite groups, and increased
possibilities for ordinary people to influence decision making at the lowest local
level. This trend was further confirmed by a recent and quite authoritative book which
discussed ‘consultative democracy’ (xieshang minzhu) and concluded that it suits
China better than a multi-party representative democracy model would.7
Consultation has a long historical tradition in China. Centuries ago Confucian
scholars established public forums for deliberating on national affairs.8 During Mao’s
time, the ‘mass line’ was emphasized as the guarantee for direct engagement and
consultation with the broad masses of the people. Consultations with non-CCP elites
have long been practised as part of the united front strategy in institutions such as the
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conferences (CPPCC). During the reform
period the CCP has followed up on the consultation strategy by co-opting economic,
technical, and intellectual elites through party recruitment policies, People’s
Congresses, professional organizations and think-tanks. Recent survey results show
that these measures have been successful, not least in relation to private entrepreneurs,
who were originally seen by many in the West as a possible driving force for
democratization, but who now generally seem to support the present regime and
oppose fundamental democratic reforms.9 As Andrew Mertha has argued, other
‘policy entrepreneurs’, such as NGOs, activists, and the media, have also gained
considerable influence on the policy process, at least in some fields.10
Consultations are intended to expand political participation and include all sectors of
society in the political process. In real politics, however, it is obvious that some members
4. David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson
Center Press, 2008).
5. ‘Highlights of President Hu’s speech at reform eulogy meeting’, Xinhua, (18 December 2008), available at:
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90785/6557160.html (accessed 25 January 2009).
6. For more on the leadership’s discourse on democracy, see Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party, pp. 120–124.
7. Zhou Tianyong, Wang Changjiang and Wang Anling, eds, Gongjian. Shiqidahou Zhongguo zhengzhi tizhi
gaige yanjiu baogao [Storming the Fortress: A Research Report on China’s Political System Reform after the 17th
Party Congress] (Xinjiang shengchan jianshe bingtuan chubanshe, 2008).
8. Chen Shengyong, ‘The native resources of deliberative politics in China’, in Ethan Leib and Baogang He, eds,
The Search for Deliberative Democracy in China (New York: Palgrave, 2006), pp. 161–174.
9. Jie Chen and Bruce Dickson, ‘Allies of the state: democratic support and regime support among China’s
private entrepreneurs’, China Quarterly 196, (December 2008), pp. 780–804.
10. Andrew Mertha, ‘Fragmented authoritarianism: political pluralization in the Chinese policy process’,
unpublished paper, available at: http://falcon.arts.cornell.edu/am847/pdf/FA_2.0.1.pdf.
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of society are more influential, respected and insightful than others, and that the
cooperation of these ‘personalities’ (renshi) is particularly essential to the party-state.
The consultation strategy was originally developed as a way of co-opting non-CCP
elites, but even the recent promotion of ‘intra-party democracy’ as a first step can be seen
as an expression of the old idea that because Party members are considered politically
more mature than the general public they should have more say in the political process.
Indeed, in recent years the Central Party School has been granted special privilege to
discuss many sensitive issues with more freedom and in a more deliberative manner.
Nevertheless, Chinese consultative institutions are designed to strengthen
authoritarianism, so although national leaders speak favourably about consultative
democracy, their efforts to spread local reform experiments in this field are limited,
their attitude toward them are cautious, and they like to ensure that these reforms are
firmly under central control. In short, what we are witnessing is a process of renewing
and refining authoritarianism through consultative mechanisms. The two cases
below should be seen as examples of how local officials test the present limits of
consultative authoritarianism. The cases are far from representative of political
processes in China, but national level reforms often build on local experiments, so the
fate of such experiments can tell us much about the direction of future changes.
Case 1: deliberative pollings in Zeguo township, Wenling city, Zhejiang11
From 2005 to 2009 the Zeguo government held a series of public consultations,
utilizing deliberative polling techniques whose results have direct input in the
township decision process. It has attempted to develop a democratic and scientific
decision-making model in which the voice of the people and the deliberation of local
deputies are combined.
The processes of deliberative polling include a scientific random sample of the
public, the provision of the randomly selected participants with a baseline question-
naire and briefing materials, small group and large group sessions in which participants
engage in serious deliberation about policy alternatives, and a final questionnaire.
Before the deliberation, the baseline questionnaire requires participants to record
their opinions and positions on a number of policy issues. After the deliberation, the
participants are asked to complete the same questionnaire again. The differences
between the two are used to identify whether the participants change their opinions,
which in turn measures the effectiveness of the deliberative process. Deliberative
polling techniques are thus used to identify public opinion and generate considered
public judgment through discussion and debate. Additionally they can engender
political influence as leaders utilize them for guidance in decision making and for
legitimating those decisions.
In 2005 Zeguo township of Wenling city introduced China’s first experiment in
deliberative polling. Using the techniques developed by Professor James Fishkin
the township deliberated about which infrastructure projects would be funded in the
coming year. The deliberative polling process was intended to reveal what the public
11. For a detailed discussion on the experiments, see Baogang He, Deliberative Democracy: Theory, Method and
Practice (Beijing: China’s Social Science Publishers, 2008) and James Fishkin et al., ‘Deliberative democracy in an
unlikely place deliberative polling in China’, British Journal of Political Science 40(2), 2010, pp. 435–448.
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might think if it had a chance to become more informed. Of the entire Zeguo
population, 275 people were randomly selected to participate in this deliberative poll.
The random selection in 2005 was based on households, with each selected
household sending one family member. The selected family member was usually
male so women were under-represented in the sample.
Zeguo town has an area of 63.12 square kilometres; the centre area is 6.5 square
kilometres. It has jurisdiction over 89 villages and nine urban residential committees.
The permanent local population is 119,200 and the floating (migrant) population is
120,000. Zeguo’s industry has been developing rapidly. The average annual net
income of farmers is 8,255 yuan. Zeguo was listed as 145th of the top 20,000 towns
by their multiple development index at the national level. It is also ranked 30th of the
top 100 with multiple strengths in Zhejiang province. With a vibrant private economy
private tax contributions constitute a large proportion of the local budget. Private
businessmen and interest groups desire to express their voices about public policies
that affect their economic life. As a result, consultation meetings are organized in
response to the demand from the private sector.
Party secretary Jiang Zhaohua of Zeguo was the key figure in the Zeguo
deliberative poll experiment. He decided to adopt this method after taking part in an
international conference on deliberative democracy organized by Baogang He in
November 2004. Jiang had organized a series of Chinese indigenous ‘heart-to-heart
talks’ (kentan) when he was party secretary in Wenqiao town in 2003. For him,
deliberative polling was an extension of his previous work with more scientific
features. Jiang graduated from Jilin University where he specialized in philosophy
and became interested in the works of John Locke.
Deliberative polling at Zeguo built on the local practice of kentan, but avoided
their shortcomings of inequality, lack of representation, and lack of clear results.
Unlike in deliberative polls elsewhere, however, officials in Zeguo treated the
deliberative poll as an empowered representative assembly by announcing in advance
that they would abide by the results of the poll. The results from the Zeguo deliber-
ative poll were submitted to Zeguo’s People’s Congress for discussion on 30 April
2005. Out of 112 deputies, 92 attended the meeting, 84 voted for the top 12 projects,
seven voted against them, and one deputy abstained.
After the success of the first deliberative polling experiment, the second
experiment took place in Zeguo on 20 March 2006. It involved 237 randomly
selected citizens who participated in a one day event deliberating on the expenditure
allocation of the annual budget, the advantages and disadvantages of each project,
and ranking the options for 2006. The second experiment made three improvements
on the 2005 experiment. First, an electoral list rather than the household register was
used; thus individual citizens, rather than households, formed the unit for the random
selection process. As a result, 99 women were randomly selected, constituting 41.8%
of the sample. Second, participants were not only provided with detailed information
about the projects, but were also taken to visit each project site, and the third
improvement involved having various experts available for consultation on the day
of the deliberation.
During this deliberation the participants expressed a genuine concern with
environmental issues. As a result, one officer was designated as having responsibility
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for environmental affairs and approximately one million yuan was allocated to clean
up the whole town. Each village received 8,000 yuan to build a rubbish collection
centre, and an additional 1,000–3,000 yuan was provided for the clean-up of the
remaining rubbish in every village.
The third deliberative polling experiment involved 197 randomly selected citizens
and was held on 20 February 2008. Three improvements emerged from this
experiment. First, the content of deliberative polling was widened to encompass all of
the town’s budgetary issues. The government of Zeguo township prepared a 48-page
‘2008 Zeguo Township Budget of Expenditures’ detailing the 248.523 million RMB.
The budget allocation list was more detailed than that of previous participatory
budgeting projects in Wenling city.
The second improvement relates to the way in which the participants interacted
with the deputies of the local People’s Congress. The interaction was a two-fold
process. In order to better understand the formation of public opinion, 63 deputies
observed the entire deliberative polling process. Similarly, ten of the 197 participants
were randomly selected to observe the way in which the deputies deliberated the
budget at the meeting of the local People’s Congress on 29 February 2008. This
improved level of interaction between citizens and deputies directly impacted on the
decision-making process.
The third improvement focused on the outcome of the experiment. The People’s
Congress of Zeguo township and the Zeguo township government endorsed public
opinion following the deliberative process. Together with the People’s Congress, the
township government made a decision to increase the budget from 20,000 to 100,000
RMB in order to meet public demand seeking an increase in the pension for rural
seniors. In responding to the request for additional infrastructure funding, the
township government and People’s Congress reallocated 400,000 RMB to subsidize
construction in poor villages. When public opinion was divided on whether two
million RMB should be spent on the redevelopment of Wenchang Pavilion, the local
People’s Congress and the Zeguo government cut funding to one million RMB. This
decision received public support. Prior to deliberation, the mean support for
redeveloping Wenchang Pavilion was 5.9. However, it dropped to 5.0 in the second
survey following deliberation. Similarly, the Zeguo government’s decision to
increase environmental funding by 8.89% was largely a result of the 2005, 2006 and
2008 deliberative polls which determined that environmental issues were a key
priority for citizens.
The fourth experiment in deliberative polling on the township budget was held on
21 February 2009. Several improvements were made. First, the questions were
adapted to make them more suitable to budget issues. Second, ten migrant workers
were invited to form a small separate discussion group to discuss budget issues.
Third, rather than discussing the whole budget, which is too complex to be addressed
adequately in one day, the deliberative process focused on the most important issues
of the education budget and the subsidy budget across the town. Fourth, the result was
presented to Zeguo People’s Congress only two days later on 23 February so as to
ensure an intensive interaction between deliberative polling and the local People’s
Congress.
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There are many problems associated with these experiments. The decision to
introduce them was made by party secretaries; they were not citizen-initiated. This is
known as ‘an authoritarian deliberation’.12 Deliberative institutions lack an
independent and impartial monitoring system. The main function of deliberative
institutions is consultation with citizens over certain policies, but the leaders still make
the final decisions on all issues. Nevertheless, they still represent a significant attempt
at step-by-step reforming of the decision-making processes at the local level and they
have received positive coverage in the Chinese media.
Case 2: consultative elections of township leaders in Ya’an municipality, Sichuan
The second case involves experiments with direct election of township leaders in four
townships in Ya’an municipality, a mountainous area west of Chengdu, Sichuan.13
The elections were held on 21–23 April 2006 and were part of a project implemented
by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences with the support of Danida, the Danish
International Development Agency. Ya’an was chosen as the location for this project
because it is well known for political-administrative reforms involving consultations
with the population. It was among the most prominent advocates of the system
known as ‘public recommendation, public selection’ (gongtui gongxuan) of local
officials in 2001–2002,14 and in 2002 it started experimenting with direct election of
representatives to county level Party Congresses.15 It is noteworthy that the two
county level localities in which the latter experiments were conducted—Yucheng
District and Yingjing County—were also among the three counties that were
involved in the 2006 elections. In this way Ya’an has gradually gained status as a
laboratory for political reforms.
Initiator and prime mover in the 2006 elections was Zhang Jinming, municipal
deputy party secretary in Ya’an. Zhang is known as a strong supporter of local
elections and is quite a political celebrity in China. She stood behind the famous
election of a township mayor in Buyun in 1998,16 and although this election was later
declared unconstitutional Zhang continued to advance inside the party hierarchy. She
came to Ya’an in 2002 as head of the powerful organization department responsible
12. See Baogang He, ‘Western theories of deliberative democracy and the Chinese practice of complex
deliberative governance’, in Leib and He, eds, The Search for Deliberative Democracy in China, pp. 133–148.
13. A more detailed account of this experiment can be found in Stig Thøgersen, Jørgen Elklit and Lisheng Dong,
‘Consultative elections of Chinese township leaders: the case of an experiment in Ya’an, Sichuan’, China Information
22(1), (2008), pp. 67–89. Baogang He, Thøgersen, Elklit and Dong all took part in the preparation of the elections.
The latter three observed the campaign and the elections.
14. For a discussion of this system, see Tony Saich and Xuedong Yang, ‘Innovation in China’s local governance:
open recommendation and selection’, Pacific Affairs 76(2), (2003), pp. 185–208. For more details on how it was
practised in Ya’an, see Lai Hairong, ‘Jingzhengxing xuanju zai Sichuan sheng xiang-zhen yi ji de fazhan’ [‘The
development of competitive elections at the township level in Sichuan province’], Zhanlu¨e yu guanli [Strategy and
Management ], no. 2, (2003), pp. 57–70.
15. Joseph Fewsmith, ‘Institutional innovation at the grassroots level: two case studies’, China Leadership
Monitor 18, (2006).
16. On this and other township election experiments in the late 1990s, see Joseph Y. S. Cheng, ‘Direct elections
of town and township heads in China: the Dapeng and Buyun experiments’, China Information 15(1), (2001),
pp. 104–137; Baogang He and Youxing Lang, ‘China’s first direct election of the township head: a case study of
Buyun’, Japanese Journal of Political Science 2(1), (2001), pp. 1–22; Lianjiang Li, ‘The politics of introducing
direct township elections in China’, China Quarterly 171, (September 2002), pp. 704–723.
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for the appointment of cadres and stood behind the 2002 experiment with direct
election of Party Congress deputies. The township election experiments initiated by
her received the ‘Chinese Local Government Trailblazer Award’.17
Although Ya’an is a test site for political experiments it is neither prosperous nor
particularly peaceful. The area has been plagued by the same problems and
contradictions that haunt other inland rural areas, and in October 2004 it was shaken
by massive popular protests and demonstrations against inadequate compensation
paid to villagers for the loss of farmland in connection with the construction of a huge
dam on one of the large rivers flowing through the district from the Tibetan plateau.
The local leadership’s wish to push for political reforms was undoubtedly rooted in a
perceived need for improving cadre–peasant relations, although the elections were
planned before the demonstrations and did not involve Hanyuan County where the
protests were centred.
The experiment in 2006 aimed at giving the population more say over the
appointment of leading township cadres. Formally, local government leaders are
elected by the township People’s Congress while party leaders are elected by the
Party Congress. In reality, however, the appointment of both party and government
leaders lies in the hands of the county party committee and the organization
department, and the election procedures for local bodies are more or less a formality.
Even when People’s Congress delegates do manage to get an alternative candidate
elected it is still, in Melanie Manion’s words, ‘a purely elite game’.18 In contrast, the
idea behind the Ya’an elections was that all candidates should be evaluated by
the local population. Appointments were still to be carried out in accordance with the
regulations—otherwise they would be declared unconstitutional as happened in
the Buyun case—but Zhang intended the decision of the voters to serve as an
important, and in reality, binding guideline. During the election campaign voters
were given the clear impression that they would be electing their own leaders.
The most innovative aspect of the Ya’an experiment was that all citizens could
vote directly for candidates to all leading positions in their township. Unlike Buyun
where only the mayor was up for election, the Ya’an experiment involved both party
and government leaders: one party secretary, two deputies, and four ordinary party
committee members; two members of the discipline inspection committee; one
mayor and two deputies mayors were to be elected in each township. Because of
overlapping roles (for example mayors who were also deputy party secretaries), these
posts would be filled by only seven people, and voters could therefore vote for a
maximum of seven names.
The preselection requirements concerning the candidates’ age, education, and
work experience, were set so high that out of a total population of 23,306 only
90 persons in the four townships met them. In the end 67 candidates stood for
election, mainly incumbent officials. Fifty-eight of them (87%) were CCP members.
17. He Sanwei, ‘Sichuanren Zhang Jinming wangluoshang de zhengzhi he rensheng’ [‘The politics and life of
Sichuanese Zhang Jinming on the internet’], Nanfang renwu zhoukan [Southern Personality Weekly ], (28 November
2005), available at: http://news.163.com/05/1128/10/23L0Q6NC00011E7V.html (accessed 8 August 2009).
18. Melanie Manion, ‘When Communist Party candidates can lose, who wins? Assessing the role of local
People’s Congresses in the selection of leaders in China’, China Quarterly 195, (September 2008), pp. 607–630,
quote from p. 629.
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Seen in this light the elections were primarily a way of testing the popularity of
local cadres, but there was some outside competition from school teachers, local
businessmen and a lawyer.
An important element in the experiment was an election campaign in which
candidates met the voters face-to-face. It included written self-presentations of the
candidates, news bulletins that were distributed to each household, posters and radio
broadcasts, visits to individual households by the candidates, and a series of meetings
where the candidates gave short speeches and answered questions from the voters.
Candidates could not run on independent political platforms, however. The printed
material contained only a brief CV and a self-presentation with general remarks about
what each candidate would work for, and the contenders were not supposed to discuss
or argue with each other during the public meetings.
The actual elections were conducted over one day in each township. They were
well organized and the procedures were followed quite closely. The turn-out rate was
87% of the registered voters, which is quite impressive considering that proxy votes
were not allowed. The counting of the votes was done in public with several of the
candidates present and it appeared to be correct and systematic. The results were
publicized shortly after the vote counting concluded.
Only several days after the elections was their merely consultative nature revealed.
The final appointment of cadres took place in the four township People’s Congresses
and Party Congresses between 30 April and 15 May, and it did not always reflect
election results. In Hejiang township the deputy party secretary, who had been newly
appointed, received fewer votes than two candidates with more local experience, but
was allowed to keep his position. The new leaders in Hejiang were in fact ranked in
exactly the same order as they had appeared on the official list of candidates, which
was probably the order in which the county level party organization wanted them to
be elected in the first place. In other words, the voters’ decision had no apparent
influence on the appointments.
In Guanhua township the party secretary and his two deputies were all new in their
positions, and while one of the deputies was supported by 80% of the voters the party
secretary and the other deputy only received 49% and 46% of the votes, respectively.
When the appointments were published, however, it turned out that the party
secretary was allowed to keep his position while the winner was only appointed as
mayor. In Renyi the mayor was clearly beaten by his female deputy in the election but
maintained his position all the same. In Sanhe the final appointments were also quite
different from what the voters had asked for. The winner of the election, who was
head of the township enterprise office, got no position at all, while the incumbent
mayor and a deputy party secretary were appointed party secretary and mayor,
respectively, although they only came in third and fifth.
It turned out that what had originally been planned as decisive elections had been
turned into a consultation process. All the new leading cadres were selected among
the ten candidates in each township who had received the most votes, but within the
top ten the county authorities, and to some extent maybe even local congress
deputies, chose rather freely regardless of the exact number of votes. According to
a cadre from the county organization department, this procedure struck the correct
balance between ‘the democratic rights of the masses’ and ‘the authority of the Party
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committee’. The elections did have some effects in real life. The masses managed to
get rid of a deputy party secretary and two deputy mayors who did not make it into
the top ten and subsequently lost their positions.19
All in all, the Ya’an experiment did not reform the formal political structure in
order to make it more democratic, but it introduced procedures that exposed local
leaders to the verdict of the voters. This helped higher level party organs to select
better and more popular cadres without depriving the party organization of the power
it has through the nomenclature system. The elections gave all voters a chance to
express their opinion of the township leaders directly, not just indirectly through
People’s Congress representatives, but it still operated within the framework of
consultative authoritarianism in which the voters help the CCP to select better cadres,
while the CCP takes care to present capable candidates whom the voters will trust
and support.
In spite of this moderate approach, however, the Ya’an model had apparently gone
too far. The first public report on the experiment was positive. In late July Southern
Weekend described the elections as a good way of ensuring that local officials
appointed by the CCP would be welcomed by the masses, and this report soon spread
on CCP websites.20 In August, however, Sheng Huaren, vice chairman of the
National People’s Congress, warned that hostile forces in the West used local
elections as a spearhead for their infiltration of China, and he explicitly condemned
any attempts at direct elections at the township level.21 This blocked any hope of
making the Ya’an elections a model for political reforms.
Incentives, strategies, and linkage to national level reforms
Both Jiang Zhaohua and Zhang Jinming were clearly the driving forces behind their
respective experiments. In Zeguo, Jiang was the person who made the significant
decision to adopt deliberative polling in November 2004, and he later followed the
procedures of deliberative polling without compromise. In Ya’an, Zhang Jinming
was in charge of the entire election process from writing up the procedures to the final
appointments. What motivated these local leaders to engage in such political
experiments, and what did the experiments mean for their careers?
There were several reasons why Jiang Zhaohua adopted transparent deliberations
to prioritize capital construction projects. First of all, he wanted to avoid charges of
having ‘siphoned off cash’. He could also use the public opinion produced by
deliberative forums to convince the less willing to vacate their homes if the
construction projects made this necessary and, at a more general level, deliberative
forums gave him an opportunity to share the responsibility for the capital construc-
tion projects with the citizens, because they themselves had selected them.
19. Ma Changbo, ‘Laobaixing xian tuixuan, dang zuzhi zai dingren’ [‘First ordinary people recommend and elect,
then the Party organization decides the person’], Nanfang zhoumo [Southern Weekend ], (27 July 2006), available at:
http://www.southcn.com/weekend/commend/200607270005.htm (accessed 13 August 2009).
20. Ibid.
21. Sheng Huaren, ‘Yifa zuohao xian-xiang liang ji renda huanjie xuanju gongzuo’ [‘Do a good job of electing
new People’s Congresses at the township and county levels according to the law’], Qiushi [Seek the Truth ],
(17 August 2006), available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/theory/2006-08/17/content_5046196.htm (accessed 10
December 2006).
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As a skilled politician Mr Jiang was fully aware that administrative methods of
coercive suppression and harsh control are incapable of solving sharp social conflicts.
In contrast, deliberative forums are quite a good mechanism for harmonizing
conflicts between interests. In 1990, for example, one town leadership used
administrative methods to abolish an old market and set aside some new land to open
a new one. They encountered widespread popular resistance and protest, with the
result that the old market carried on as usual, while the new one turned out to be a
waste of money. The township leaders learned from this event that they should have
convened a democratic roundtable beforehand to solicit suggestions from the people
and thus avoid making a wrong decision.
In order to reduce the political risk, Jiang Zhaohua ensured that the experiment fit
the model of a ‘scientific, democratic and legal’ decision-making process advocated
by the CCP.22 In particular, the result of deliberative polling was submitted to the
deputies of the local People’s Congress so that the final process of deliberative
polling followed China’s constitution which stipulates that major decisions about
local affairs must be made through the local People’s Congress. Jiang’s experiment
was fully supported by Wenling city leaders and he was promoted from township
party secretary to deputy mayor of Wenling city in early 2007.
Similar to Jiang Zhaohua, Zhang Jinming also saw consultative mechanisms as a
way to improve relations between cadres and the general population. In a 2007
interview, Zhang explained why she had become engaged in election reforms in the
first place. In 1998, when Zhang became party secretary of Shizhong district in
Suining municipality, there had been several scandals in the district involving
local officials. Zhang wanted to involve the population more directly in the
selection of a new batch of leaders, because she reasoned that if everyone takes
part in a public election, the risk and responsibility will be shared.23 Even if the new
cadres should turn out to be as bad as the old ones, it would not to the same extent
rebound on Zhang, or on the CCP. In this way consultative mechanisms can
strengthen the legitimacy of the decisions made by local leaders and can thereby
make it easier for them to reach their targets of economic development, social
stability, etc.
Zhang also believed that the party’s management of cadres should shift from the
direct appointment of specific persons to the establishment of a mechanism or system
whereby the party committees could manage the cadres by fair and just means. In this
way, party leaders can be freed from large numbers of trivial personnel disputes,
reduce grievances and friction to some extent, and successfully avoid all sorts of
suspicion and misunderstanding that people have about the management of cadres.24
Public and direct elections are thus seen as a cost-saving method to produce
trustworthy leadership backed by an involved electorate.
Zhang does not hide that personal ambitions also played a role in forming her
decision in 1998. Arranging China’s first direct election of a township head was
a unique opportunity for a young district party secretary to ‘make a great contribution
22. The principle of scientific, democratic and legal decision making was adopted at the 16th National Congress in
2002 and reaffirmed at the 17th; see http://en.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid¼11877 (accessed 26 July 2008).
23. The authors’ talk with Mrs Zhang in November 2003 in Ya’An.
24. Zhang Jinming, ‘Not merely an election of a few township officials’, Lingdao kexue 3, (1999), pp. 16–17.
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and accomplish a great task’.25 However, engaging in political experiments is risky.
One strategy for reducing risk was to use the party line and official language. In 2002
she had developed a new approach. Instead of trying to circumvent or even break
official rules, as she had been accused of doing in Buyun, she would operate inside
the system and use the opportunities provided by the existing legal framework.
Securing personal backing from one’s superiors is another essential part of a
reform strategy. An experiment must match the mentality of higher level leaders and,
still more importantly, these leaders have to see the experiment as useful in solving
social problems. Zhang’s later political experiments in Ya’an have been supported by
the leaders of the organization department in Sichuan province. She was promoted to
deputy party secretary of the municipality and was able to gain national fame at the
same time. However, in the media she presents her reforms with great caution and is
careful not to provoke conservative forces unnecessarily. In the 2007 interview with
Nanfang zhoumo she only mentioned the election experiment discussed in Case 2 in
passing, while her reforms of intra-party democracy, which are less controversial,
receive much more attention.
Both Zhang and Jiang have gained support from their leaders, and their strategies
have been tailored to fit into the general policy line of the central leadership in order
to reduce any political risk. Their political reforms are limited to administrative areas
within the accepted framework of the central leadership.
Both experiments have various complex and subtle relations with national level
reforms. In early 1998, well before the election in Buyun in December, the Ministry
of Civil Affairs (MoCA) proposed that township elections be held the same year. In
March 1998, Zhan Chengfu, the MoCA official in charge of implementing village
elections, drafted a document stating that ‘if approved by local authorities direct
township elections can be tried in some places where suitable conditions exist’. The
proposal first gained wide acceptance at a Beidaihe meeting and even received the
approval of Wen Jiabao, but in the end it was rejected at the subsequent Politburo
meeting in Beijing.26 According to Zhan Chengfu, Zhang Jinming met ‘a leader’ (she
mentions no name) at a training course for county party secretaries in 1998. Echoing
the original document this leader confirmed that direct township elections could be
held if conditions were ripe, and he added with a smile: ‘Well, here in Sichuan we
have had no direct elections yet’. Zhang was encouraged by this hint and thought it
indicated that a direct election would receive support from above, so she went ahead
with her plans. In the end, the provincial leadership actually did back her up, even
though the experiment was criticized by Li Peng, then the chairman of the National
People’s Congress.
In the case of deliberative experiments, one Wenling official met a cool criticism
from the department of propaganda of Zhejiang province for his writing that has
linked indigenous heart-to-heart talks to Western theories of deliberative democracy
in 2005. Also the department of propaganda of Zhejiang province did not approve the
publication of a collection of international conference papers on deliberative
democracy.
25. The authors’ talk with Mrs Zhang in November 2003 in Ya’An.
26. Baogang He’s interview with Zhan Chengfu in August 2001 in Beijing.
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Since then the winds of change have blown from above. In 2005 Li Junru, Vice
President of the Central Party School, openly advocated deliberative democracy.27
Later the Central Party School’s official journal Study Times published an editorial
endorsing a deliberative polling experiment in Zeguo on 12 December 2005. In
2006, deliberative democracy was endorsed as a way of reforming the Chinese
People’s Political Consultative Conference.28 Significantly, in December 2008, Xi
Jinping, who is supposed to be the successor to President Hu Jintao, went to Zhejiang
province for inspection and investigation. The party secretary of Zeguo township was
selected to give a brief on intra-party democracy and deliberative polling experi-
ments; he was the only township leader present. This has a symbolic meaning
for Zeguo’s deliberative democracy experiment, as it has now been noted by
central leaders.
Receiving positive signals from Beijing, the leaders of Taizhou (a prefecture city
which controls the county-city of Wenling) have actively promoted various forms of
deliberative democracy experimentation in this region between 2007 and 2009. Their
intention is to create a political brand for Taizhou: the best practice of deliberative
democracy in China! In particular, they are hoping that the official document of the
18th Party Congress in 2012 will mention, endorse and promote deliberative
democracy experiments nationally. It is very striking that local political reformers try
to find out and satisfy the ‘real’ intention of central leaders. This is a special feature of
China’s reform. In organizing deliberative democracy experiments Chinese local
officials are concerned with their career, their work and the potential to attract
attention from central leaders.
As mentioned above, both experiments have complex links to national level
reforms and national leaders. Like earlier local experiments in the economic field
they may later be judged successful by higher level leaders and be developed into
national policies, or they may remain single, isolated events in China’s political
history. So it remains to be seen how these two local experiments will spread and
develop in the future. Current central leaders are worried about the consequences of
township elections so Ya’an’s election experiment will not be repeated elsewhere—at
least not any time soon. In order to prevent regime-change democratization, however,
Beijing leaders are advocating consultative and deliberative democracy. In this
context, the Wenling experiments have already been promoted by the Taizhou
government.
The toolbox of consultative authoritarianism
At first glance the two cases we have presented here are quite dissimilar: one is about
public deliberation on budget issues while the other is about the election of local
officials. On closer examination, however, the elections were conducted on the
basis of consultation or deliberation. Even intra-party democracy discussed below is
consultative. We need to locate these two cases in the context of wider experi-
mentations of various consultative forms employed by the Chinese government.
27. Li Junru, ‘What kind of democracy should China establish?’, Beijing Daily, (26 September 2005).
28. People’s Daily, (2 March 2006).
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Below we will outline other consultative devices which are also designed to build
new linkage mechanisms between local government and the population.
Public hearings (tingzhenghui) have been promoted over the last decade as a way
of democratizing the policy-making process. The Chinese Price Law from 1998
stipulated that price rises on monopolized goods and services such as heating,
electricity and public transport should be approved by a panel of representatives from
relevant organizations and ordinary consumers after a public hearing. The Legislation
Law from 2000 likewise specified that consultations with all interested parties,
including ordinary citizens affected by the law, should be held prior to the
passing of new legislation.29 Hearings on price rises receive considerable attention
in the Chinese press, and they seem to be quite common. Consumers complain,
however, that such hearings are often just empty formalities. Results have been
fixed in advance, and popular opposition to price rises is rarely taken seriously.
According to the critics, the composition of the panels, together with uneven access to
information between the companies and the government on the one hand and the
consumers on the other, guarantee that the companies’ requests for price rises are
usually accepted.30
In connection with the passing of new legislation People’s Congresses sometimes
hold public hearings where experts and ordinary citizens can comment on draft laws.
In June 2009, for example, the provincial People’s Congress in Jilin organized a
public hearing in connection with the introduction of new employment regulations.
The 14 panelists had several wide-ranging suggestions for how the authorities could
facilitate job seeking. Among other measures they recommended reduced school fees
for children of migrant workers and easier access to micro credit for entrepreneurial
university graduates. The official report from the hearing claimed that these
grassroots suggestions made the legislation process ‘more scientific, more
democratic, and closer to the masses’, but it contained no information about actual
changes to the regulations based on these inputs from the public.31 It is generally
difficult to estimate how much effect such consultations have on the legislation
process, but it is evident that the participants do not have any decisive influence.
Public hearings may give the authorities a more precise picture of how price rises
and new legislation will be received by the public and thereby solve some potential
social conflicts. Citizens, however, may well come to see them as mere window
dressing because of their lack of real impact, and they are therefore not likely to
generate much political legitimacy. As a critical Chinese researcher observes, this
kind of ‘administrative democracy’ has limited value in a context of a ‘still imperfect’
(shang bu wanshan) political democracy.32
Public opinion surveys have for some years featured prominently in the Chinese
media where they are generally presented as a reliable and scientific way for leaders
29. Tang Xianxing, ‘Gonggong juece tingzheng: Xingzheng minzhu de jiazhi he juxianxing’ [‘Public policy-
making hearings: the value and limitations of administrative democracy’], Shehui Kexue [Social Science ] 6, (2008),
pp. 40–48.
30. ‘Tingzhenghui ¼ tingzhanghui?’ [‘Are public hearings ¼ price rising meetings?’], Zhongguo renda [Chinese
People’s Congress ], (10 November 2008), pp. 8–9.
31. Zhao Yu and Gao Feng, ‘Tingzhenghui ting minsheng’ [‘Hearing the people’s voice at a public hearing’], Jilin
Renda [Jilin People’s Congress ] 7, (2009), pp. 4–5.
32. Tang Xianxing, ‘Gonggong juece tingzheng’, p. 44.
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to learn about what common people think. There are now state run ‘public opinion
service centers’ (sheqing minyi diaocha zhongxin) in 25 provinces, and universities
and private companies also operate in this field. Many surveys measure the
popularity of local leaders or the level of satisfaction with particular institutions and
can be seen as a tool for higher level leaders to control their subordinates.33 Other
surveys address specific issues of public concern, and they are claimed to have a
direct impact on political decision making. Some of these issues concern everyday
matters, as when Chongqing decided to lift the city’s total ban on fireworks and
replace it by less restrictive regulations after conducting a public opinion survey
before the Chinese New Year in 2005.34 Other surveys measure attitudes to larger
issues. In July 2008 the central CCP Organization Department asked the National
Statistics Bureau to carry out an independent survey of 80,000 cadres’ and citizens’
level of satisfaction with its work. The result showed a satisfaction rate of 73.55%,
and the whole exercise was presented as a successful way of ‘asking the people for
political advice’.35 On 20 August 2008, all 12 districts in Guangzhou city carried
out a survey whose result was meant to have a direct impact on the political life of
local cadres. If a cadre’s dissatisfaction rate reached 50%, he or she would be
regarded as ‘disqualified’.36 Surveys are thus used in several contexts to gauge
public opinion.
The technical aspects of Chinese public opinion surveys have been improved
considerably over the last few years. Refined sampling procedures, better training
of interviewers and more advanced statistical treatment of the data may well make
public opinion surveys a more reliable source of information than public hearings,
whose panels are not necessarily representative. Surveys are, however, even easier
to manipulate than the hearings. The authorities are not forced to publish results
that place them in a less than flattering light or show support for policies they do
not favour, and they can also directly manipulate the answers. In any case, the
results are even less binding than the votes after public hearings, which may
actually block price rises. Because of their non-committal nature, public opinion
surveys should therefore not be expected to play any major role in generating
political legitimacy.
The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) has organized a
series of consultative meetings which included the democratic parties, celebrities
without party affiliation, social organizations, ethnic minorities and patriots in the
political process. It was identified by former President Jiang Zemin in 1991 as the site
of consultative democracy, while the National People’s Congress constituted a form
of electoral democracy.37 In 2006, consultative democracy was endorsed as a way of
33. Guojia tongjiju zonghesi [National Statistics Bureau General Office], Ma Jiantang chuxi sheqing minyi
diaocha gongzuo huiyi [Ma Jianchang Chairs Work Meeting on Public Opinion Surveys], (24 June 2009).
34. ‘Shou ge guanfang min-diao jigou’ [‘The first official public opinion survey organ’], Xinhuashe, (17 October
2005).
35. ‘Bawan ren canjia quanguo zuzhi gongzuo manyidu minyi diaocha’ [’80,000 people in national public opinion
survey of the level of satisfaction with organizational work’], Zhongguo gongchandang xinwenwang, (29 April 2009),
available at: http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64107/64109/9218254.html.
36. See www.stnn.cc, (20 August 2008).
37. Zhou Tianrong, ‘Deliberative democracy and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference’,
Zhongguo Renmin Zhengxie Lilun Yanjiuhui Huikan, 1, (2007), pp. 18–21.
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reforming the CPPCC in the official document of the Central Party Committee.38
After the 2007 17th Party Congress all major national policies must be discussed
through the CPPCC, a body which engages in often lengthy deliberations, but lacks
either the power of decision or veto.
Intra-party democracy has been a CCP catchphrase since 2002 when the 16th
National Congress of the Communist Party of China confirmed it as fundamental to
the future survival of the CCP. Recently the communique´ of the Fourth Plenary
Session of the 17th Central Committee in September 2009 called intra-party
democracy nothing less than ‘the lifeblood of the Party’.39 The actual programme of
intra-party democracy is largely consultative. The stated aim is to give ordinary
party members more room for free discussion and more influence on the election of
Party Congress delegates, and to give these delegates more say over the election of
local leaders. Ya’an has been at the forefront in developing the democratic
evaluation meeting, a sort of consultative mechanism for the appointment of local
party leaders. In 2003 at an annual Party Congress in Ya’an city all major leaders
were evaluated by party representatives, 40% of whom had to be ordinary members.
Crucially, if any leader did not gain a confidence vote of over 70%, a dismissal
process would begin automatically against him/her. In practice, a leader is given a
warning after the first no-confidence vote, and an opportunity to improve his or her
work within one year. Dismissal only occurs after the second no-confidence vote.
Through such measures the CCP hopes to increase the political involvement of
its members.
Consultative intra-party democracy only strengthens the political participation of
party members, of course, so in terms of identifying the policy preferences of
ordinary citizens and generating political legitimacy its success depends on the extent
to which party members are actually able to represent the general population. As
party members are more disciplined and more schooled in basic party principles,
however, they can also be expected to be easier to control, so the political risk
involved in intra-party elections is much smaller than in the Ya’an township election
experiment in 2006.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the two cases and all other tools and innovations we have examined
have redefined and refined the practice of consultative authoritarianism. This
consultative and even deliberative style of authoritarianism aims at increasing the
involvement of citizens in the political process; identifying people’s policy
preferences; solving practical problems without seriously challenging the existing
political structure; and generating political legitimacy. In this model of
authoritarianism coercion will be tamed and regulated, while discussion, deliberation
and voting are used to identify and articulate the preference of people. What the
38. People’s Daily, (2 March 2006).
39. ‘CPC to expand intra-Party democracy: communique´’, Xinhua, (18 September 2009), available at: http://
english.sina.com/china/2009/0918/271536.html. Baogang He, ‘Intra-Party Democracy: A Revisionist Perspective
from Belau’, in The Chinese Communist Party in Reform, eds., Kjeld Erik Broedsgaard and Yongnian Zheng,
Routledge, 2006, pp. 192–209.
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reformers, and the CCP, gain is the ability to legitimize policies by reference to
relatively inclusive consultative and deliberative processes. In this way the reforms
can increase the political capacity of the CCP and prolong the authoritarian system
while furthering the careers of reform-minded party officials.
Judging from the experiments the reforms are not going to change the basic
structure of the system. The party will maintain its power over all important
decisions and—contrary to the intensions and hopes of many foreign observers
and rule-of-law proponents—divisions between party and government and
between formal procedures and actual power will remain vaguely defined and
partly fictional. Chinese political reform does not restrict the political power of
the state; instead it aims at the rational regularization of power and the astute
exploitation of power through consultation and deliberation. All the tools and
innovations examined fall into the category of administrative reform and they differ
from the liberal reform programme which aims to minimize state power and maximize
the freedom of citizens, offering citizens an authentic mechanism for genuine
participation. The leaders in Beijing do not endorse liberal reform; and even township
elections are manipulated in ways which create a chimera of consultation.
The Chinese consultative authoritarian system has inherent weaknesses which
constrain the extent and scope of political action. ‘Township elections’ cannot decide
the final result of who would be the head of a township. Consultative and
deliberative institutions cannot discuss constitutional matters or evolve into any kind of
political movement, and politically sensitive issues cannot be brought to the table for
deliberation. The experiments are localized and carefully managed to prevent
them from expanding or moving into other areas which might threaten the control of the
regime. Moreover, the absence of freedom of the press and lack of a political
opposition prevent the development of a fully deliberative system. It seems that
China in some way mimics Singapore’s authoritarian model, but goes beyond it,
developing a uniquely Chinese model of consultative and deliberative authoritarianism.
Although the reforms do not challenge China’s existing political system, we
nevertheless find that they are important because they propagate and promulgate the
idea that the population should have a decisive voice when major decisions are made
and when local leaders are appointed, and that local leaders should face the citizens
directly, solicit their advice, answer their questions, listen to their complaints, and try
to gain their support. Reformers such as Zhang Jinming and Jiang Zhaohua are
acutely aware of the need to select better and more popular cadres who can make
better and more popular decisions, so they work to develop a range of instruments
that can link them to the population and communicate public opinion to them.
Deliberative forums and consultative elections are techniques which match these
aims admirably.
The innovative experiments are also important because Chinese consultative
authoritarianism has evolved into a deliberative form of authoritarianism. The
Chinese government certainly does not want to be identified with brutal, suppressive
and uncivilized authoritarianism. In short, Beijing seeks to ensure that today’s China
is not yesterday’s Nazi Germany or even yesterday’s China. The nature of this
consultative authoritarianism is a mixed regime of authoritarianism and
democratic elements. The praxis of China’s mixed regime appears to follow a
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pattern whereby authoritarian elements constitute the essence, while democracy
provides the formal instruments and procedures with democracy being minimal
at best. This regime pattern combines the persistence of China’s totalitarian
legacy, and the domination of authoritarianism with a small proportion of demo-
cratic elements. The mixed regime as a whole system is not democratic, but is
rather consultative authoritarianism with deliberative mechanisms, input and
influence.40
40. For a detailed discussion on the mixed regime, see Baogang He, Rural Democracy in China (New York:
Palgrave, 2007), pp. 222–227.
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